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ABSTRACT
SHADOWS OF THE PAST: THE EFFECTS OF MOVEMENTS’ PAST STRATEGY
ON THIRD-PARTIES’ SUPPORT FOR ITS CURRENT STRATEGY
MAY 2020
SEYED NIMA ORAZANI, B.A., SHAHID BEHESHTI UNIVERSITY
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Bernhard Leidner & Professor Michael J. A. Wohl
Social movements benefit from third-party support in waging social change. The
budding literature on the effects of social movements’ strategy (violent vs. nonviolent) on
third-parties’ willingness to support and join the social movement has mainly regarded
social movements’ strategy as something fixed and unrelated to its past strategy. Using
varied contexts, I investigated how social movements’ past strategy may affect, if any,
third parties’ moral perception of the current strategy of social movements and how this
perception translates into third parties’ (un)willingness to support and join social
movements. In the context of the conflict between hate groups and counter-protestors in a
lesser-known country, Bhutan (Studies 1 & 4), and an ally country (Study 2) American
participants were more willing to support and join a violent movement that was
previously nonviolent as opposed to a historically violent movement. Perceived moral
continuity of movements’ strategy (Studies 1-5) and perceiving violent strategies as the
last resort (Studies 2-4) mediated the relationship between change in movements’
strategy and third parties’ willingness to support and join the movement. However, using
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a conflictual context in which a movement, Liberation of Tamil Ealam, sought to gain
independence from a government, Sri Lankan government (Study 3), and a domestic antiFascist movement in the United States, Antifa, that aims to combat hate groups led to
partial replication of findings of Studies 1-2 & 4. While there was no statistically
significant difference between conditions (shifting from nonviolence to violence vs.
continuing violence) in third parties’ willingness to support and join the movement,
perceived moral continuity of movements’ strategy (Studies 3 & 5) and perceiving
violence as the last resort (Study 3) mediated the relationship between conditions and
third parties’ willingness to support and join the movement. Theoretical and practical
implications for social movements are discussed. Specifically, social movements that
have exhausted nonviolent avenues to achieve their goals are likely to find support
among third-parties for a shift toward violent strategies—support that may ultimately
lead to either desired social change or conflict escalation.

Keywords: social movements, collective action, strategy shift, moral continuity, thirdparty support
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
“In the past, with militant violent Nazi groups, the anti-fascist strategy was obvious.
Make sure they don’t march, block them, be ready to fight them physically if necessary,
stop them from organizing. Now it is more difficult. With populist movements, it is hard
to always justify militant strategies against them as public opinion is shifting, as the
violence the far-right advocates is not clear and apparent.”
-

Preston, Danish Anti-fascist and filmmaker (as cited in Bray, 2017)

According to Preston, social movements need to adapt to shifts in the social and
political arena to survive and achieve their goals. Put differently, it may not be in a social
movement’s best interest to cling to previously determined strategies when social realities
change. For example, when peaceful protests of injustice have not been successful,
members of the social movement may deem violent strategies to be a legitimate and
effective way of bringing about justice. Such was the case for Antifa—an anti-Fascism
social movement that primarily takes collective action in opposition to fascist
movements. Antifa has been historically nonviolent in its methods. Recently, the social
movement has become open to allowing members to engage in violence to counter
violent fascist groups in the United States (Bary, 2017). Such a decision, however, may
be deemed unacceptable by third parties (i.e., groups other than those directly involved in
the movement), which could negatively influence the social movement’s ability to
achieve its goals (Tausch, Becker, Spears, Christ, Saab, & Singh, 2011; Bruneau, Lane,
& Saleem, 2017; Feinberg, Willer, & Kovacheff, 2017; Orazani & Leidner, 2018,
Thomas & Louis, 2014).
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Indeed, research on collective action shows that, power struggles are embedded in
a wider societal context (Simon & Klandermans, 2001, Stürmer & Simon, 2004). As
such, struggles between antagonistic groups also involve third parties (e.g., societal
authorities or the general public). Importantly, social movements need to control,
influence, or enlist third parties for their collective action to be successful (Louis, 2009).
This is because public opinion plays a substantial role in policy change (Burstein, 2003;
Burstein & Linton, 2002).
Aside from whether a social movement can sway third-parties to adopt their
goals, social movements also have to convince third-parties that the methods used to
achieve those goals are acceptable (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). Typically, third parties
are more supportive of nonviolent than violent strategies (Becker, Tausch, Spears, &
Christ, 2011; Bruneau, Lane, & Saleem, 2017; Feinberg, Willer, & Kovacheff, 2017;
Orazani & Leidner, 2018). Indeed, a growing body of research has shown that perceived
commitment to the group goal by the majority of third-party observers and perceived lack
of solidarity (Becker, Tausch, Spears, & Christ, 2011), perceive morality of the
movement’s strategy (Orazani & Leidner, 2018), perceived violence of the movement
(Bruneau, Lane, & Saleem, 2017), and identification with the movement (Feinberg,
Willer, & Kovacheff, 2017) mediate the relationship between movements’ strategy
(violent vs. nonviolent social movements) and the amount of support third-party
observers are willing to offer to the social movement.
In the current research, I tested the idea that although third parties tend to refrain
from supporting violent strategies, the use of violence may be more palatable to third
parties if the social movement has tried and failed to achieve success through
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nonviolence. Surprisingly, although social movements constantly react to ever-changing
social realities by adjusting their strategies to the context in which they are fighting
against social injustices (Shellman, Levey, & Young, 2013), the collective action
literature has been relatively silent on how changes in strategy influence third-party
support. Herein, I investigated how third parties perceive a shift in a social movements’
strategy from nonviolence to violence. Specifically, I addressed whether shifts to a
violent strategy attracts (or diminishes) third-party support as well as how third parties
perceive social movements that shift to using violence compared to social movements
that have always used violence.
Gandhi or Che?: The advantages of nonviolent (rather than violent) strategies to
wage social change
Social movements have always been a main avenue for social change. However,
the strategies social movements use to achieve their stated goals differ widely. Whilst
some social movements use peaceful means to initiate social change, others are willing to
use violence for the same purpose. Sociological as well as social psychological literature
typically use this dichotomous categorization for the strategy a social movement
employs. Scholars, however, use various terminology to describe this dichotomy. Some
researchers use the term violent and nonviolent (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011, Orazani &
Leidner, 2018), some use normative and non-normative collective action (Tausch,
Becker, Spears, Christ, Saab, & Singh, 2011; Zaal, Laar, Stahl, Ellemers, & Derks, 2011),
others use radicalism and activism (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009), or moderate versus
militant political action (Barnes & Kaase, 1979; see also Thomas & Louis, 2014). Herein,
I use the nonviolence and violence vernacular since it is conceptually the closest
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terminology to what I intend to investigate. It also has less evaluative connotations
compared to other terminologies such as moderate versus militant action or radicalism
versus activism.
Regardless of the terminology used, there is a debate about the utility of a strategy
that includes violence. Typically, there is an implicit assumption among scholars and lay
people that violence is more effective than nonviolence to wage social change in both
domestic and foreign affairs (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). History is replete with
examples of successful social movements that have used violence. For example,
American independence was only achieved when they took up arms against the British.
At face value, it seems self-evident that in using violence, as compared to nonviolence, a
social movement applies more pressure in the direction of wanted change. Nonetheless,
violence is rejected as a means to engage in social change under most circumstances (see
Arapura, 1997). Specifically, it is argued that nonviolence is both spiritually untenable
and strategically unwise because it rarely brings about the desired change (Stephan &
Chenoweth, 2008; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2012).
There are two observations that cast doubt on the efficacy of violence as the only
way of bringing about social justice. First, not all violent movements have been able to
accomplish what they set out as their goal(s) (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). For
example, it was the Irish Republican Army’s nonviolent political wing that achieved
some of the goals of those who wanted Irish independence from the United Kingdom.
Second, there are various examples of successful nonviolent social movements; Indians
with the leadership of Gandhi forced out one of the leading colonist countries out of their
country.
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Nascent sociological and social psychological research has been trying to solve
the violent verses nonviolent strategy puzzle by taking a quantitative approach. For
example, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) analyzed archival data on social movements
from 1900 to 2006 and found that nonviolent (rather than violent) movements were six
times more likely to fully achieve their stated goals. Lab-based research from the field of
social psychology (e.g., Becker, Tausch, Spears, & Christ, 2011; Bruneau, Lane, &
Saleem, 2017; Feinberg, Willer, & Kovacheff, 2017; Orazani & Leidner, 2018, Thomas
& Louis, 2014) has showed that third-party observers are more willing to support and
join nonviolent movements. The tendency to support nonviolence over violence not only
emerged with regard to environmental cause/context (Thomas & Louis, 2014), but it also
was observed in political context; a context in which people keenly resort to violence
(Feinberg, Willer, & Kovacheff, 2017; Orazani & Leidner, 2018). Feinberg and his
colleagues (2017) showed that in the context of Black Lives Matter movement and in an
Anti-Trump rally participants identified more with nonviolent rather than violent
movement which in turn led to more willingness to support the movement. Orazani and
Leidner (2018a) demonstrated that in a context in which violence may be perceived as
legitimate and even necessary that is, supporting the Green Movement in Iran after a
failed political nonviolent demonstration against a corrupt and authoritarian regime,
participants saw the members of nonviolent (rather than violent) movements as more
capable of experiencing mental states such as pain and suffering. As research in moral
psychology has shown the more people believe that an entity (e.g., humans and animals)
is capable of experiencing pain and other mental states, the more moral sensitivity and
moral responsibility they attribute to the agent (Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012).
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Consequently, third-party observers were more willing to support the nonviolent
movement and had more positive attitudes toward joining it. These results were
replicated with American participants using a hypothetical foreign movement, a real
foreign movement, and a real domestic movement (Orazani and Leidner, 2018b). These
studies have revealed that third-party observers, in general, root for nonviolence and
favor it over violence.
To my knowledge, however, research has yet to assess how third parties perceive
social movements’ current strategy in its historical context, especially third parties’ moral
perception of the movement’s current strategy which has significant implications for third
party support for the movement. Social movements may go through enormous changes as
a result of interaction with complex social realities they are embedded in. Change in
strategy is one among many.
In the ever-changing context of social movements, third-parties’ moral perception
of social movements’ current strategy may be a function of their past strategy. In other
words, the social movement’s past strategy may affect how third parties perceive its
current strategy. In this sense, perceived morality of the current strategy is a relative
concept. As research on collective action shows (Orazani & Leidner, 2018a, 2018b), the
extent of third party support for social movements is partially a function of their moral
image of the social movement. Drawing on this literature, we expect that any change in
social movements’ strategy that signifies social movements’ moral decline from third
parties’ points of view (known as moral discontinuity), should be associated with
decreased third parties’ willingness to support and join the movement.
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It is worth noting that in addition to the relative conception of moral perception I
discussed above, there is an overall evaluation of a social movement. This means that
although third-party observers may perceive the current strategy of a social movement as
less moral compared to its past strategy and this in turn, may be associated with less
support, but third party may still want more support for such a movement compared to
another social movement due to various reasons. In the context of my dissertation, it may
be that third-party observers perceive a historically violent movement even less moral
than a historically nonviolent movement that recently changed its strategy to violent.
Therefore, طeven when the former nonviolent social movement is perceived as less moral
due to its shift to violence, the overall moral evaluation of such movement may be still
better off than a historically violent movement.
Dynamics of movements’ strategy: Shifts in movements’ strategy through its life
span and its effects on third-parties’ perception of its current strategy
The strategy that social movements use to achieve their goals is not static.
Strategy shift and change depends on the current social contexts (i.e., the strategies used
are typically dynamic in nature). That is, social movements change their strategies to
address context-specific issues raised in various stage of its life span to achieve their
goals (Dudouet, 2013; Duhart, 2017; Shellman, Levey, & Young, 2013). For example,
Shellman and his colleagues (2013) showed that government repression and third-party
observers’ attitudes towards the conflict between the government and dissidents are
predictors of violent and nonviolent phase change. In the context of political campaigns
that seek self-determination, Cunningham (2013) showed that violent campaigns receive
more support – to the extent that the conflict may escalate into a civil war – when (a)
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dissidents’ groups are large and excluded from political power, (b) they suffer from
economic discrimination, (c) their goal is to seek independence, (d) they are internally
fragmented, (e) and the country in which they operate has low levels of economic
development. Grant II and Wallace (1991) examined why strikes turn into violence. They
found that situational factors such as the social context in which strikes happen, legal
structures that regulate participants’ behavior, and countertactics of the opponent play
major role in encouraging people to adopt violent strategies. Interestingly, however,
theorists and experimentalist in the collective action literature typically examine the
strategies social movements use as if they are fixed—categorizing a social movement as
one that uses violent or nonviolent strategies (see Orazani & Leidner, 2018; Thomas &
Louis, 2014; Bruneau, Lane, & Saleem, 2017). As such, they fail to take into account the
dynamic nature of social movements and the historical as well as contemporary social
contexts that may yield shifts and changes to the strategy a social movement may
employ. I argue that historical and contemporary social context may alter how members
of a social movement as well as third parties perceive the use of violence or nonviolence.
Specifically, if a social movement has been using a nonviolent strategy for a period of
time with limited success, then resorting to violence may be perceived to be (more)
legitimate and perhaps necessary to achieve its goals compared to a social movement that
has been historically violnet.
The current collective action literature also failed to take into consideration how
the social movements’ opponent can influence the strategy adopted by social movements.
This is likely because in research on social movements, the typical opponent (or
adversary) of a social movement being assessed is the government or forces affiliated

8

with the government such as the national guard or the police force (see Feinberg, Willer,
& Kovacheff, 2017; Orazani, Leidner, 2018a, 2018b). Since these entities represent law
and order, there are strong social norms about respecting and obeying the law and thus
using violence against the government is highly likely to be perceive as a move that
destabilizes the society, leading to endangering people’s safety and security. However,
there are times that a social movement’s opponent is not the government, but another
social movement. How do third-party observers perceive violence in the absence of such
strong law-abiding norms? Moreover, how do third-party observers perceive violence or
a shift toward violence in the face of an adversary social movement that uses violence?
Such a social context is exemplified by the 2017 events in Charlottesville, VA
(Tyrangiel, 2017) in which a far-right rally led to violent clash with counter-protestors
and the decision by Antifa in the aftermath of that rally to explicitly support the use of
violence to combat hate groups such as KKK, neo-Nazis, and White-nationalists.
Specifically, Antifa members shifted their belief about using violence—legitimizing it as
a needed tool in the fight against hate groups after a long period of using failed
nonviolent strategies. Although some research has suggested that such a shift toward
violence may lead to some success (see Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008), they may lose the
support of third parties who typically do not condone the use of violence (Chenoweth &
Stephan, 2011)—support that is needed for collective action to be ultimately successful
(Louis, 2009). In this research, I examined how third parties judge the use of violence or
the shift toward violence by a social movement in such a context.
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Overview of studies
Five studies examined how third-party observers perceive violence in the context
of movements’ history and how this perception translates into third parties’
(un)willingness to support and join social movements. I hypothesize that third-party
observers support violent strategies when the movement has been historically nonviolent
as compared to a historically violent movement that choses to continue its use of
violence. Moreover, I expect movement shift from nonviolent to violence damages its
morality in that third-party observers do not perceive the movement as moral as it used to
be. Finally, I hypothesize that third-party observers perceive violence as the last resort
when the social movement has been historically nonviolent as opposed to a historically
violent social movement that its current strategy is still violent.
In a conflictual context between hate groups and counter-protestors in a foreign
country, Bhutan, Study 1 investigated how movement shift in its strategy from
nonviolence to violence affects third-party observers’ support. This study also tested the
mediational effect of moral (dis)continuity of the movement on third-party support. Using
a similar context as in Study 1 but in a different country, that is, a tense relationship
between hate groups and counter-protestors in the United Kingdom, Study 2 managed to
replicate the results of Study 1. Study 3 investigated if findings from Studies 1 and 2 hold
in a completely different conflict in a foreign country, that is, the conflict between Sri
Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam, a separatist minority
group that has been seeking independence from Sri Lankan government due to longlasting social, economic, and political injustices. Returning to the context I used in Study
1 and 2, Study 4 extended my focus to potential mediators through which people want
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more support for a currently violent movement that has been historically nonviolent as
opposed to a historically violent movement. Since in Studies 1-4 participants (Americans)
were considered outgroups in relation to movements’ members, Study 5 addressed the
issue of replicability in an ingroup context by using a domestic movement as the context
of study.
For each study, I conducted an a priori power analysis using G*Power 3.1.9.2
(Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2013). After entering effect size (d = 0.3), a error
probability (0.05), power (0.80), allocation ratio (1), and using a two-tailed test, the
required sample size was 352. I used a small effect size to avoid type 2 error. Finally, I
decided to recruit 100 more participants per study as a buffer in case participants needed
to be removed from the sample for, among other reasons, poor data quality.
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CHAPTER 2
STUDY 1
The main purpose of Study 1 was to examine how third parties’ perception of a
social movement current strategy (i.e., violent strategies) in the light of its past strategy
(i.e., either violent or nonviolent strategies) may affect their willingness to support and
join the social movement. I chose Bhutan, a real country in East Asia, as the context of
the study. Since it was likely that most American participants were not familiar with this
country or the social or political situation it is currently facing, it allowed us to avoid any
confounding effect attributable to variables other than our variables of interests such as
participants’ identification with the country and the like.
Method
Participants
Four hundred and sixty-six American participants were recruited via
Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). They were compensated with $.50 cents for
their time. Twelve participants reported not being born in the United States, one
participant reported not being a native English speaker, one participant spent significantly
more time to complete the survey (univariate outlier analysis: 3 SD above the mean;
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), 121 did not pay attention to the manipulation materials (as
evidenced by incorrect answers to questions that checked core facts of the manipulation
materials, such as the initial strategy of the movement or the decision the movement’s
members made), two participants did not answer the vast majority of questions (as
indicated by leaving the slider’s bar in the middle of the scale where it initially was), and
13 participants stated that they did not provide high quality responses in the survey.
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These participants were removed, leaving 316 participants for data analysis (194 female,
two participants did not reveal their sexual identity, age M = 40.53, SD = 13.43, range =
18-86).
Procedure
After granting informed consent, participants completed a measure that assessed
their attitudes towards the use of violence as a legitimate and necessary strategy in the
context of social movement. Participants then read a fictitious UN Watch report (based
on true facts) about the “rise in the number of hate groups operating in Bhutan, a country
in South Asia.” Participants were told that “These groups, including extremist nationalists
and racist groups, have organized rallies and arrived well-equipped in order to engage in
aggressive behaviors”.
In the report, participants also read about a social movement called Buhfa (Bhutan
For All) that aims to combat hate groups. For half of participants, Bhufa was depicted as
a violent social movement since it was founded in 1920. They were then told: “Recently,
however, there was a heated debate about the effectiveness of their strategy.”
Nonetheless, members unanimously decided to continue to use violence (no shift
condition) to combat hate groups. For the other half of participants, the social movement
was depicted as a historically nonviolent movement. But this time, after a heated debate
about the effectiveness of their strategy, movement members unanimously voted to adopt
a violent strategy to challenge hate groups (shift in strategy condition).
After reading the scenarios, participants completed a battery of questionnaires
(described below in the order appeared in the survey) on a scale from 1 to 9. Unless noted
otherwise, the scale endpoints were labeled Strongly Disagree and Strongly Agree.
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Materials
Attitude towards use of violence
Five items assessed the extent to which participants perceived violence as a
legitimate strategy in the context of social movements (“There is a time and place for
violent strategies in social movements.”, “Under some circumstances, social movements
need to use violence to be effective.”, “Sometimes resorting to violence can protect
people that protest against hate groups.”, “There are times when it is necessary for social
movements to use violence against their opponents.”, and “Sometimes violent strategies
can guarantee protesters' safety (e.g. when the opposing group is aggressive/violent).”; a
= .90, M = 3.67, SD = 2.03).
Willingness to support the movement
Three items measured the extent to which participants were willing to support the
movement (“I would donate money to help Bhufa.” and “I would sign a petition to
support Bhufa.”; r = .74, M = 4.33, SD = 2.42). One item was dropped due to the factor
loading less than .40.
Willingness to join the movement
Three items assessed the extent to which participants were willing to play a role in
the movement as a member (“I would join Bhufa.” and “I would play an active part in
Bhufa.”; r = .87, M = 3.24, SD = 2.19). One item was dropped due to the factor loading
less than .40.
Perceived moral continuity of the movement
Five items assessed to what extent participants believed that the moral essence of
the movement was remained intact after the vote. Participants first, read the stem “Given
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the recent decision Bhufa made about its strategy, I believe ...”, and then they indicated
their opinion on the following items: “… Bhufa is no longer as moral as it used to be.”,
“… the morality of Bhufa today is unchanged.”, “… this vote undermined the moral
foundation of Bhufa.”, “… the morality of Bhufa remains the same.”, and “Bhufa has
become, if anything, more moral.”; a = .89, M = 4.45, SD = 1.94).
Attention checks
Two items assessed if participants understand the content pertaining to the
manipulation (“According to the report you just read, when Bhufa was found, the
movement purposefully chose a(n) … strategy to combat hate groups in Bhutan?”,
“According to the report you just read, what was Bhufa’s recent decision about its
original strategy to combat hate group?”)
Results
Correlations and overall means (standard deviations) can be found in Table 1. As
expected, willingness to support and join the movement were positively significantly
correlated. Perceived moral continuity was positively significantly associated with both
willingness to support and join the movement.
Attitudes towards use of violence was first subjected to an independent t-test.
Participants in shifting condition had significantly (t(314) = -2.21, p = .02) more positive
(M = 3.87) attitudes toward using violence in the context of social movement as
compared to no shift condition (M = 3.36). All variables then were subjected to
ANCOVA with shift from nonviolence to violence/continuing violence as independent
variable and attitudes towards violence as covariate (see Table 2).
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As summarized in Table 2, participants were more willing to join and support a
historically nonviolent movement that recently has changed its strategy to violence
compared to a historically violent movement. However, the effect of strategy on
willingness to support was marginal. Moreover, there was a significant effect of condition
on perceived moral continuity. When the social movement decided to change its strategy
from nonviolence to violence as opposed to continuing violence participants perceived
the social movement as less moral as it used to be.
Mediational analysis.
We tested the mediational effect of moral continuity on the relationship between
shift in strategy and willingness to support and join the movement. As can be seen in
Figures 1 and 2, using 5,000 bootstrap samples and 95% confidence intervals (Hayes,
2013, PROCESS Model 4), moral continuity of the movement partially mediated the
relationship between shift in movement strategy and participants’ willingness to support
(effect = -.82, SE = .14, 95% CI [-1.12, -.57]) and join (effect = -.71, SE = .13 95% CI [1.00, -.49]) the movement.
Discussion
Study 1 showed that third-party observers had a differential perception of
violence as an adopted strategy by social movements depending upon the history of the
movement. When the social movement was initially nonviolent, and due to the inefficacy
of nonviolence considered violence as its new strategy, participants were more willing to
join and support it as opposed to when the movement was violent since its formation.
This shift from nonviolence to violence, however, damaged the moral image of the social
movement such that the current strategy (i.e., violence) compared to its past strategy (i.e.,
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nonviolence) is perceived as less moral. In other words, shifting from nonviolence to
violence is perceived as a moral collapse. Such collapse is associated with less
willingness to support and join the social movement. It is of great importance to note that
a historically violent social movement that decides to continue its use of violence does
not elicit such moral decline when third-party observers compare its current strategy with
its past strategy. This implies that a violent social movement that continues its violent
strategy does not suffer from such a moral decline since there is no change. However, it
does not necessarily mean that the overall moral evaluation of a violent movement who
has been historically violent is better off compared to a historically nonviolent movement
that just recently shifts its strategy to violence. Indeed, third parties’ perception of the
social movement’s morality did not worsen when the movement decided to continue its
main strategy which was violent. Shifting from nonviolence to violence, however, did
worsen third parties’ perception of the social movement’s morality. It is important to note
that despite such decrease in the social movement’s morality, third party observers still
were more willing to support the movement.
To my knowledge, Study 1 is the first attempt in the social psychological
literature to understand a social movements’ strategy by putting it in the historical context
from which social movements originate. The results suggested that the current use of
violence was construed differently depending whether the movement used to use nonviolence (or whether violence was always deemed an acceptable strategy). This indicates
that perceptions of a social movements and its strategy are not created in a social vacuum.
Rather, perceptions of a social movement’s use of violence is embedded in interrelated
complex social realities.
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Several issues, however, needed to be addressed. First, although Bhutan is a real
country, most participants were not familiar with it or the social or political situation it is
currently facing, which may affect external validity of the observed findings. Moreover, I
had participants evaluate a fictitious social movement (i.e., Bhufa). To increase external
and ecological validity and extend the results to a real-world social movement of which
most participants will be aware, I used the United Kingdom as the context of choice.
Because the United Kingdom is one of the closest allies of the U.S. and falls into the
category of the Global North or Western countries/cultures, American participants should
be more familiar with it. I also shortened the excerpt used in the manipulation so it would
be easier for participants to read it thoroughly. This way, I decreased the likelihood of
excluding participants due to a lengthy manipulation. Finally, one might contend that
perceived moral continuity is confounded with perceived inconsistency between previous
and current strategy of the movement since the latter is a broader concept and
encompasses the former. Therefore, in Study 2, I used perceived inconsistency between
previous and current strategy of the social movement as a covariate to see if the results
would hold with regard to moral continuity.
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CHAPTER 3
STUDY 2
Method
Participants
I recruited 447 American participants via Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk
(MTurk). They were compensated with $.50 cents for their time. After excluding 22
participants who were not born in the United States or were not native English speaker,
118 participants who did not pay attention to the manipulation materials (as evidenced by
incorrect answers to questions that checked core facts of the manipulation materials, such
as the initial strategy of the movement or the decision the movement’s members made),
and 22 participants who stated that they did not provide high quality responses in the
survey, 285 participants were retained for data analysis (139 female, two participants did
not reveal their sexual identity, age M = 38.34, SD = 13.24, range = 19-84).
Procedure
Participants were exposed to the same procedure as in Study 1. Only the name of
the country and social movement was changed. After giving consent, participants were
asked about their attitude towards adopting violence in the context of social movement.
Then they read a short report about a tense relationship between a real hate group in the
United Kingdom, that is, the November 9th Society, and counter-protestors. Because I
wanted two distinct groups as both sides of the conflict, I used a fictitious name for
counter-protestors, that is, No Hate Speech (NHS).
First, participants read about the “rise in hate group activity in the UK” right after
the UK decided to leave the European Union. They then read about a social movement
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called NHS, which was framed as aiming to combat hate groups. As in Study 1,
depending on the condition, participants were led to believe that NHS has been a longstanding (non)violent social movement. In no shift condition, NHS was depicted violent
with no shift in their strategy after a heated debate about its efficacy. In other condition
(shift in strategy), NHS was depicted as historically nonviolent, but after a heated
discussion about the efficacy of their strategy, there was a change in their strategy from
nonviolence to violence.
After reading the report, participants completed a battery of questionnaires
(described below) on a scale from 1 to 9. Unless noted otherwise, the scale endpoints
were labeled Strongly Disagree and Strongly Agree.
Materials
I adapted the attitudes towards violence (a = .94, M = 4.17, SD = 2.31),
willingness to support (a = .94, M = 3.72, SD = 2.50) and join the movement (a = .97,
M = 3.12, SD = 2.34), and perceived moral continuity of the movement (a = .88, M =
4.34, SD = 2.48) measures used in Study 1 for the current context. Two items at the end
of the survey assessed participants’ understanding of manipulation materials.
Perceived consistency between previous and current movement strategy
Four items assessed the extent to which participants think that the current strategy
of the movement is compatible with its previous strategy (“The current strategy of NHS is
in conflict with its past strategy.”, “The current strategy of NHS completes its past
strategy.”, “The current and the past strategy of NHS is basically the same in nature.”,
and “There is no consistency between the current and past strategy of NHS.”; a = .90, M
= 4.59, SD = 2.43).
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Results
Correlations and overall means (standard deviations) can be found in Table 3.
Similar to Study 1, willingness to support and join the movement were positively
significantly associated with each other. Moreover, both willingness to support and join
the movement were positively significantly correlated with perceived moral continuity.
Perceived consistency between the current and past strategy of the social movement was
positively significantly associated with perceived moral continuity.
As in Study 1, participants’ attitude towards violence was subjected to an
independent t-test (t(283) = 1.81, p = .07). Participants in shifting condition (M = 4.38)
held more positive attitudes, though marginally, toward adopting violence as a potential
strategy in the context of social movements compared to no shift condition (M = 3.88).
All variables then were subjected to ANCOVA where condition was used as independent
variable and attitude towards adopting violent strategies as covariate (see Table 4). As
indicated in the Table 4, participants were more willing to support and join a violent
movement that was previously nonviolent as compared to a historically violent
movement. Both perceived moral continuity and perceived consistency between the
current and past strategy of the movement were significantly higher where the movement
just recently changed its strategy from nonviolence to violence.
To address the confounding effect of perceived consistency between previous and
current strategy of the movement on moral continuity, I conducted an ANCOVA entering
condition as independent variable, moral continuity as dependent variable and perceived
consistency as covariate. After controlling for the effect of perceived consistency, the
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effect of condition on moral continuity was still significant F(3, 281) = 6.80, p = .01,
Mshifting in strategy = 3.81, Mno shift = 4.97).
Mediational analysis. Using 5,000 bootstrap samples and 95% confidence
intervals (Hayes, 2013, model 4), I replicated the mediational effect of moral continuity
on the relation between shifting in movement strategy and willingness to support (effect
= -.82, SE = .17, CI 95%[-1.18, -.50]) and join the movement (effect = -.72, SE = .15, CI
95%[-1.04, -.43]; see Figures 3 and 4).
Mediational effect of moral continuity remained statistically significant after I
controlled for the effect of perceived consistency in the mediational analyses (support:
effect = .79, SE = .19, CI 95%[.43, 1.17]; Join: effect = .73, SE = .18, CI 95%[.40, 1.10]).
Discussion
Study 2 replicated the results of Study 1 with a more ecologically valid context.
As in Study 1, participants believed that shifting from nonviolence to violence as
compared to continuing violence makes the movement less moral. This perception,
however, did not come at the cost of losing third parties’ willingness to support and join
the movement. Moral continuity, as in Study 1, mediated the relation between strategy
shift and third parties’ willingness to support and join the movement. Furthermore, I
ruled out the confounding effect of perceived consistency between previous and current
movement strategy. Even after controlling for the effect of perceived consistency, the
effect of condition on moral continuity was still statistically significant.
Studies 1 and 2 successfully showed an effect of a social movement’s history on
third parties’ perception of the current strategy. A very same strategy, violence, was
deemed differently depending upon the past strategy of the social movement. When the
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social movement was depicted as historically nonviolent (rather than violent), their shift
to violence garnered more support from third-party observers compared to when the
members of the social movement decided to continue a violent strategy. This effect was
observed despite the damage such a shift caused to a historically nonviolent social
movement’s moral image.
Both Studies 1 and 2, however, used a somewhat similar conflictual context—a
tense relationship between hate groups and counter-protestors. An important question that
remains unanswered is whether other conflictual contexts would yield similar findings.
Study 3 investigated whether the same results would emerge in a conflict between a
government (Sri Lanka) and a movement seeking for independence (Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam).
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CHAPTER 4
STUDY 3
Method
Participants
I recruited 446 Americans via Mechanical Turk (MTurk). After excluding 11
participants who were not born in the U.S., 101 participants who did not pay enough
attention to the manipulation materials (as evidenced by incorrect answers to questions
that checked core facts of the manipulation materials, such as the initial strategy of the
movement or the decision the movement’s members made), 19 participants who indicated
that they did not provide high quality answers to the questionnaire, and one participants
who just clicked through the questionnaire (as evidenced by incorrect answer to an item
asking them to “move the slider all the way to the left”), 323 participants were retained
for data analysis (179 female, three participants did not reveal their sexual identity, age M
= 40.58, SD = 14.06, range = 18-86).
Procedure
First, participants were asked about their attitude towards adopting violence in the
context of social movement. Then a historical background of Liberation of Tamil Ealam
(LTE) movement was provided for participants. The social movement was depicted as a
minority group that has been experiencing discrimination “against its language and
culture” at the hands of Sri Lankan government. As in previous studies, in shifting
condition participants were led to believe that since its foundation in 1976, LTE has been
a peaceful movement. But recently after examining “the efficacy of their use of peaceful
strategies” they “unanimously voted to change their peaceful strategy to aggressive
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strategy against the Sri Lankan government, which has led to violent confrontations in the
name of Tamil independence.” In no shift condition, the movement was depicted as
violent since its foundation, and participants were told that after examining the efficacy
of their violent strategy they unanimously decided to continue their use of violence.
After reading the report, participants completed the same battery of questionnaires
(described below) on a scale from 1 to 9. Unless noted otherwise, the scale endpoints
were labeled Strongly Disagree and Strongly Agree.
Materials
I adapted the attitudes towards violence (a = .93, M = 4.03, SD = 2.30),
willingness to support the movement (r = .75, M = 3.66, SD = 2.34; one item were
dropped due to factor loading less than .40) and attitudes towards joining the
movement (r = .88, M = 2.66, SD = 2.08; one item were dropped due to factor loading
less than .40), perceived moral continuity of the movement (a = .85, M = 4.88, SD =
1.90), and perceived consistency between previous and current movement strategy (a =
.91, M = 5.23, SD = 2.42) measures used in Studies 1 and 2 for the current context. Two
items at the end of the survey assessed participants’ understanding of manipulation
materials.
Results
Correlations and overall means (standard deviations) can be found in Table 5.
Willingness to support and join the movement were positively significantly correlated
with one another. Both of the aforementioned variables were positively significantly were
associated with perceived moral continuity as well as perceived consistency. Perceived
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moral continuity and perceived consistency were also positively significantly associated
with each other.
An independent t-test revealed that participants’ attitudes towards using violence
in the context of social movement did not significantly differ between the two conditions
(t(321) = -1.12, p = .26). All variables then were subjected to ANOVA.
All variables then were subjected to ANCOVA where condition was used as
independent variable (see Table 6). The effect of condition on willingness to support and
join the social movement was not statistically significant. As in previous studies,
however, participants perceived higher moral discontinuity when the movement shifted
its strategy from nonviolent to violence. The same result emerged with regard to
perceived consistency such that participants perceived higher inconsistency when there
was a shift from nonviolence to violence as compared to when the movement continued
its previous violent strategy.
Using ANCOVA, I tested the effect of condition on moral continuity while
controlling for the confounding effect of perceived consistency between previous and
current strategy of the movement. The effect of condition on moral continuity held
although it was marginal (F(2, 320) = 2.97, p = .09).
Mediational analysis. Using 5,000 bootstrap samples and 95% confidence
intervals (Hayes, 2013, model 4), I tested the mediational effect of moral continuity on
third-parties’ willingness to support and join the movement. As shown in Figure 5 and 6,
moral continuity significantly mediated the relation between shift/no shift in strategy and
willingness to support (effect = -.88, SE = .17, CI 95%[-1.24, -.58]) and join the
movement (effect = -.67, SE = .14, CI 95%[-1.00, -.43]). I also tested the mediational
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effect of moral continuity while controlling for the effect of perceived consistency
(support: effect = .19, SE = .11, CI 95%[-.02, .43]; Join: effect = .24, SE = .14, CI 95%[.03, .52]). As results revealed, after controlling for the effect of perceived consistency,
perceived moral continuity no longer mediated the relation between condition and the
dependent variables.
Discussion
Study 3 aimed to investigate whether a different conflictual context—a minority
group seeking independence— would yield the same results as in Studies 1 and 2.
Unfortunately, results did not replicate when the outcome variable was willingness to
support and join the movement. The effect of condition on moral continuity, however,
was marginally significant even after controlling for the confounding effect of perceived
consistency. That said, the mediational effect of moral continuity vanished after
controlling for perceived consistency.
It is possible that the lack of effects in Study 3 was due to the fact that a social
movement that uses violence against a government may cause societal instability, which
may have been aversive for participants. However, instead of pursuing this or other
reasons why a shift in a social movement’s strategy did not influence support of that
social movement within the context assessed in Study 3, I returned to the context of
original interest—a tense relationship between hate groups and counter-protestors—for
several reasons. First, considering the rise of far-right political views, both in offices and
the public sphere, across Europe as well as North America this context is more relevant to
the issues various countries are grappling with. Second, in parallel with the rise of the farright movements, far-left movements such as Antifa resurrected and reconsidered the use
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of violence as a new strategy. It is vital to investigate how third-party observers perceive
this shift from nonviolence to violence in response to far-right hate groups. Third,
because I replicated our results in such context, it would be reasonable to adopt the same
context for further investigation. Fourth, results in Studies 1 and 2 indicated that even
though third-parties’ moral evaluation of the movement decreased when it shifted its
strategy from nonviolence to violence, but they still were more willing to support and
join such a social movement. In the previous studies, I did not illuminate why despite the
negative effect of perceived moral discontinuity on willingness to support and join the
movement, third-party observers provided more support for the social movement and had
more positive attitudes towards joining it. In Study 4, I sought to assess this gap in
knowledge by adding two potential mediators: perceived legitimacy of the movement
strategy and perceiving violence as the last strategy of the movement.
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CHAPTER 5
STUDY 4
To investigate why third-party observers expressed support for a violent social
movement that was previously nonviolent, I hypothesized that perceived legitimacy of
the current strategy and construing violence as the last resort and the only option
available to the movement members should be higher in the shifting condition. If thirdparty observers believe that nonviolence is still an option, adopting violence then may be
perceived as illegitimate. But, when the social movement has been nonviolent and it is no
longer efficacious, at least from the third-parties’ point of view, violence then may be
considered as legitimate and even necessary. It is worth mentioning that the concept of
(il)legitimacy has been addressed in collective action literature mostly in relation to the
situation the disadvantaged grapples with (see for example, van Zomeren, Postmes, &
Spears, 2008). In this sense, perceived illegitimacy of the situation that the disadvantaged
struggling with increases collective action tendencies. In Study 4, however, I tested the
idea that as long as third-party observers perceive a social movement’s shift in strategy
(whether it is violent or nonviolent) to be legitimate, they will be willing to support the
social movement or even join it.
Method
Participants
A total of 463 Americans were recruited via MTurk. They were compensated with
$0.50 cents. After excluding fourteen participants who were not born in the U.S., 22
participants who just clicked through the survey (as indicated by a lot of extreme answers
to all items throughout the survey), one participants who did not carefully answer to
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survey questions (as indicated by a lot of mid-point answer to all questions), nine
participants who indicated that they did not provide high quality answers to the
questionnaire, 38 who spent significantly more time to read manipulation materials than
others (univariate outliers; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), and 164 participants who did not
pay enough attention to the manipulation materials (as evidenced by incorrect answers to
questions that checked core facts of the manipulation materials, such as the initial
strategy of the movement or the decision the movement’s members made), 215
participants were retained for data analysis (115 female, two participants did not reveal
their sexual identity, age M = 36.46, SD = 12.07, range = 20-84).
Procedure
I used the same context and manipulation as in Study 1—a clash between hate
groups and counter-protestors in Bhutan. Participants were asked to indicate their opinion
about using violence as a strategy in the context of social movements. Thereafter, half of
the participants read about a historically nonviolent social movement that decided to
change its strategy to violence due to its lack of efficacy (shifting in strategy condition).
The other half read about a historically violent movement that decides to continue
violence (no shift in strategy condition). After reading this short report, participants were
asked to complete the same battery of questionnaires as in Study 1 on a scale from 1 to 9.
Two new measures were added to the questionnaire, that is, perceived legitimacy of the
current movement strategy and participants’ perception of the current strategy as the last
resort. Unless noted otherwise, the scale endpoints were labeled Strongly Disagree and
Strongly Agree.
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Material.
The measures that assessed attitudes towards violence (a = .95, M = 4.62, SD =
2.27), willingness to support (a = .94, M = 4.63, SD = 2.50) and join the movement (a =
.96, M = 3.88, SD = 2.45), perceived moral continuity of the movement (a = .84, M =
4.39, SD = 1.87), and perceived consistency between previous and current movement
strategy (a = .89, M = 4.42, SD = 2.03) were the same as those used in Study 1. Two
items at the end of the survey assessed participants’ understanding of manipulation
materials.
Perceived legitimacy of violent strategy
After reading the stem “In the light of the previous strategy of Bhufa ...”, three
items assessed the extent to which participants see the current strategy of the movement
acceptable and legitimate (“… the current strategy of Bhufa seems legitimate to me.”, “…
the current strategy of Bhufa is acceptable.”, “… I cannot approve of the current
strategy of Bhufa.”; a = .85, M = 4.51, SD = 2.16).
Perceiving violence as the last resort
After reading the stem “I think Bhufa’s recent decision about continuing/changing
its strategy to violence …” three items assessed whether participants see the current
strategy of the movement as the only choice they had (“… was one of last resort.”, “…
was the only option left at their disposal.”, “… was pre-mature.”; a = .71, M = 5.02, SD
= 1.93)
Results
Correlations and overall means (standard deviations) can be found in Table 7.
Perceiving violence as the last resort and perceived legitimacy of violence both were
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positively significantly correlated with willingness to support and join the movement.
Similar to previous studies willingness to support was positively significantly associated
with willingness to join the movement. Both willingness to support and join the
movement were positively significantly associated with perceived moral continuity.
An independent t-test revealed that participants’ attitudes towards using violence
in the context of social movement did not significantly differ between the two conditions,
t(213) = 1.81, p = .072. All variables then were subjected to ANCOVA using
participants’ attitudes towards violence as a covariate (see Table 8). As can be seen in
Table 8, participants were significantly more willing to support a violent social
movement that was previously nonviolent. There was a marginal effect of condition on
willingness to join the movement. Moreover, perceived moral continuity and perceived
consistency between the current and past strategy of the social movement were
significantly higher when the movement did not make any change to its strategy.
Mediational analysis. Consistent with Studies 1 & 2, moral discontinuity mediated
the relationship between shift/no shift in strategy and willingness to support, effect = 0.50, SE = 0.15, 95% CI [-0.84, -0.25], and join the movement, effect = -0.23, SE = 0.13,
95% CI [-0.52, -0.02]. In line with our main effect analyses, we entered attitudes towards
violence as a covariate in the mediational analyses. I then examined the mediational role
of both perceived legitimacy of the movement strategy and perceiving violence as the last
resort in the relationship between changing the movement strategy and people’s
willingness to support and join the movement. Perceived legitimacy of the movement did
not mediate the relationship between changing the movement strategy and people’s
willingness to support, effect = -0.02, SE = 0.09, 95% CI [-0.22, 0.15], and join the
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movement, effect = -0.01, SE = 0.05, 95% CI [-0.11, -0.08]. Perceiving violence as the
last resort however, mediated the relationship between changing the movement strategy
and participants’ willingness to support, effect = 0.16, SE = 0.07, 95% CI [0.05, 0.35],
and join the movement, effect = 0.08, SE = 0.05, 95% CI [0.01, 0.22].
Discussion
This study replicated and extended the findings observed in Studies 1 and 2.
Perceived moral discontinuity negatively mediated the relation between condition (i.e.,
shift/no shift in movement strategy) and willingness to support and join the movement.
Additionally, perceiving violence as the last resort positively mediated the relation
between the condition and willingness to support and join the movement. Contrary to
predictions, perceived legitimacy of the movement strategy did not mediate the relation
between the condition and participants’ willingness to support and join the movement.
Importantly, Study 4 unpacked psychological mechanism through which people are
willing to offer support to a violent movement. When the social movement was
historically nonviolent the current violence (as opposed to an inherently violent
movement) was perceived to be a strategy of last resort, which in turn was associated
with greater willingness to support and join the movement.
These findings expand social psychological literature on collective action by
introducing the effects of social movements’ history on third-parties’ perceptions of their
current strategy. To my knowledge, this research, for the very first time in collective
action literature, puts social movements’ strategy in its historical context. Previous
research on collective action has mostly investigated the effects of movements’ strategy
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in a social vacuum, disregarding dynamics of movements’ strategy and its potential
effects on how third parties here and now perceive the movement.
Thus far, all studies have been conducted with American participants in the
context of foreign movements. It is possible, however, that people are less tolerant of
violence that occurs domestically, regardless of the previous strategy used. It is arguably
easier to support violence when there is no possibility of being caught in the crossfire,
seeing harm done to fellow ingroup members and/or damage being done to ingroup sites
as a result of the violence. As such, in Study 5, I examined support for a domestic social
movement: Antifa (an anti-Fascist movement that aims to combat hate groups such as
KKK, neo-Nazis, and anti-immigrant movements). Antifa has recently attracted attention
in mainstream media due to its public use of violence to combat hate groups. Study 5
used the recent clashes between various hate groups and Antifa across the U.S. as its
context.
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CHAPTER 6
STUDY 5
Method
Participants
Four hundred and sixty American participants were recruited via MTurk and were
compensated with $0.50 cents. After excluding 24 participants who were not born in the
U.S., two participants whose native language was not English, 139 participants who did
not pay enough attention to the manipulation materials (as evidenced by incorrect
answers to questions that checked core facts of the manipulation materials, such as the
initial strategy of the movement or the decision the movement’s members made), four
who spent significantly more time to read manipulation materials that others (univariate
outliers; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), five who spent significantly more time to complete
the survey in its entirety, two who did not carefully answer to survey questions (as
indicated by a lot of mid-point answer to all questions), and four who just clicked through
the survey (as indicated by a lot of extreme answers to all items throughout the survey),
280 participants were retained for data analysis (172 female, four participants did not
reveal their sexual identity, age M = 39.95, SD = 14.00, range = 19-77).
Procedure
Participants first, were asked to indicate their opinion about using violence as a
strategy in the context of social movements. All participants then, read a fictitious report
published by Pew Research Center indicating that there has been a rise in hate groups
activities such as White supremacists, KKK, and neo-Nazis across the United States.
Participants then were told about Antifa as a fifty-year-old social movement that has been
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combating hate groups in the United States. In one condition Antifa was depicted as a
historically nonviolent movement that in the light of the recent rise of hate groups
decided to change its strategy from nonviolence to violence to fight against hate groups.
In the other condition, Antifa was depicted as a historically violent movement which
aimed to continue the use of violence to combat hate groups.
Materials. Attitudes towards violence (a = .93, M = 3.77, SD = 2.21), willingness
to support (a = .93, M = 2.84, SD = 2.32) and join the movement (a = .97, M = 2.24, SD
= 1.94), perceived moral continuity of the movement (a = .88, M = 4.94, SD = 2.48),
perceived consistency between previous and current movement strategy (a = .84, M =
4.86, SD = 2.44), perceived legitimacy of violent strategy (a = .90, M = 3.71, SD = 2.51),
and perceiving violence as the last resort (a = .76, M = 4.06, SD = 2.20) were measured
as in Study 4.
Results
Correlations and overall means (standard deviations) can be found in Table 9. As
in previous studies, willingness to support and join the movement were positively and
significantly correlated. These two main dependent variables were positively significantly
correlated with perceived moral continuity, perceiving violence as the last resort, and
perceived legitimacy of violence.
An independent t-test revealed that participants’ attitudes towards using violence
in the context of social movement did not significantly differ between the two conditions,
t(278) = 0.57, p = .567. All variables then were subjected to ANOVA (see Table 10).
There was no significant effect of condition on willingness to support and join the
movement. However, there was a significant effect of condition on perceived moral

36

continuity and perceived consistency. Both perceived moral continuity and perceived
consistency were higher in condition in which the social movement continued its past
strategy, that is, violence. There was no significant effect of condition on perceived
legitimacy of violence and perceiving the violence as the last resort.
Mediational analysis. As in previous studies, I examined the mediational role of
perceived moral continuity of the movement, perceived legitimacy of the movement, and
perceiving violence as the last resort in the relationship of condition and participants’
willingness to support and join the movement. In line with previous studies perceived
moral continuity of the movement negatively mediated the relationship between
condition (no shift vs. shift in movement strategy) and willingness to support, effect = 1.18, SE = 0.20, 95% CI [-1.62, -0.84], and join the movement, effect = -0.94, SE = 0.18,
95% CI [-1.33, -0.63]. However, perceived legitimacy of the strategy and perceiving the
movement strategy as the last resort did not mediate the relation between condition and
participants’ willingness to support and join the movement (see Table 11).
Discussion
Using a domestic movement in the U.S. (i.e., Antifa), I could only partially
replicate results of Studies 1, 2 and 3. Although third parties’ willingness to support and
join the movement did not significantly differ between two conditions, perceived moral
continuity of the movement and perceived consistency between past and present
movement were significantly different in two conditions. Similar to Studies 1-4,
perceived moral continuity of the social movement mediated the relationship between the
condition (shift vs. not shift in strategy) and willingness to support and join the
movement. Perceiving the current violence as the last resort however, did not mediate the
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relationship between change in strategy and the two main outcome variables (i.e.,
willingness to support and join the movement).
Integrated data analysis
Removing data from statistical analyses due to various reasons such as not
providing good quality data or not paying enough attention to the manipulation materials
reduces the probability of rejecting null hypothesis when it is false (known as the power
of the study; Ellis, 2010). As a remedy to such effect, I first, collapsed all data across five
studies. I then introduced conditions (shifting from nonviolence to violence vs.
continuing violence) and study (Studies 1-5) as independent variables. Using integrated
data leads to higher power due to increased number of participants (Ellis, 2010). It also
allows the researcher to examine whether any study-specific factor has effects on the
main dependent variables. Using a GLM model in SAS 9.4, I ran an ANCOVA while
participants’ attitudes towards using violent in the context of social movement was
introduced as covariate. Main effects and interaction effects are shown in Table 12.
Means and standard deviations can be found in Table 13.
As indicate in the Table 12, there was a main effect of condition and study on
willingness to support the social movement. Participants wanted more support for a
historically nonviolent movement that recently decided to change its strategy to violence
as opposed to a historically violent movement. All preplanned comparisons between
levels of study—an independent variable with five levels which each level represents an
individual study—were significantly different, ts(1451) > |3.49|, p < .001, except there
was no significant difference between Study 1 & 4, t(1451) = 1.20, p = .230, and Study 2
& 3, t(1451) = -0.44, p = .664. The interaction effect was not significant (see Figure 7).
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The main effect of condition and study on willingness to join the social movement
was significant. There was also a significant interaction between the two independent
variables, that is, condition and the context of the study (see Figure 8). In a conflictual
context between a hate group and a social movement in a foreign country (i.e., Bhutan,
Study 1), American participants were more willing to join a violent movement that was
previously nonviolent as compared to a historically violent movement, t(1451) = -2.14, p
= .032. The same effect emerged in Study 2, though more pronounced, t(1451) = -4.32, p
< .001, with the same conflictual context (i.e., a conflict between hate groups and a social
movement), although this time the conflict had arisen in the United Kingdom; one of the
closest allies of the United States. There was no significant difference between the two
condition in three other studies, ts(1451) < |1.50|, p > .250 (Studies 3-5).
The main effect of condition and study along with the interaction effect on
perceived moral continuity was significant (see Figure 9). Participants in all studies
perceived more moral discontinuity when the movement changed its strategy from
nonviolence to violence as opposed to continuing its previous violence, ts(1451) > 6.25, p
< .001. This effect however, was more pronounced in some conditions, ts(1451) > 8.20, p
< .001, (Studies 1, 3, & 5) than the others, Study 2, t(1451) = 6.35, p < .001, and Study 4,
t(1451) = 6.26, p < .001.
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CHAPTER 7
GENERAL DISCUSSION
I aimed to situate social movements in the historical contexts from which they
emerged. In doing so, I examined whether strategies used in the past (violence vs.
nonviolence) influence third-party observers’ willingness to accept a social movement’s
current use of violence. I also examined whether a shift in the social movement’s strategy
affects third-party observers’ moral perception of the social movement. Studies 1, 2 and 4
(Bhutan in Studies 1 and 4, UK in Study 2) showed that third-party observers provided
more support for a historically nonviolent movement that has recently changed its
strategy to violence compared to a historically violent movement. These results indicated
that the very same strategy, violence, was judged differently when the past strategy of the
movement was taken into account. A shift in strategy from nonviolence to violence,
however, led third-party observers to perceive the new movement strategy as less moral
compared to its past strategy. This change in third-parties’ moral perception of the
movement did not come at the cost of less support for the movement though. These
results emerged in a conflictual context in which there was a clash between hate groups
and counter-protestors. Study 3 did not yield the same results. Unlike Studies 1 and 2, in
a conflictual context in which a minority group, Liberation of Tamil Eelam, was seeking
independence from Sri Lankan government, third-party observers were not more willing
to support a violent movement with a historically nonviolent background compared to a
historically violent movement. Perceived moral continuity of the movement however,
mediated the relationship between shift in movement strategy and willingness to support
and join the movement.
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Study 4 replicated and extended results of Studies 1 and 2. Participants were more
willing to support and join a social movement that had a history of failed nonviolent
strategies and recently changed its strategy to violence, as compared to a historically
violent movement. Perceiving the current use of violence as a last resort strategy
mediated the relation between change in strategy and third parties’ willingness to support
and join the social movement. Using a domestic movement in the U.S. (i.e., Antifa)
however, led to partial replication of results I found in previous studies. Although there
was no significant difference in third parties’ willingness to support and join the
movement between two conditions, perceived moral continuity of the movement
mediated the relation between change in strategy and willingness to support and join the
movement.
Implications
History matters
The current literature on social movements has been silent about the effect of
social movements past strategy on its current strategy. Collective action literature mostly
examined the effects of a social movement’s strategy in a social vacuum (Becker et al.,
2011; Bruneau et al., 2017; Feinberg et al., 2017; Orazani & Leidner, 2018; Thomas &
Louis, 2014). The current research has introduced a great deal of nuance into the
literature by situating social movements in their historical context. Third parties’
perception of the current movement strategy is, partly, a function of its past strategy.
Such dynamic approach to understanding social movements (and third-party
support) is akin to what Bar-Tal (2013) calls “collective memory” within the context of
intractable intergroup conflicts. Research on such conflicts (Bar-Tal, 2003; Keynan,
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2014; Nicholson, 2017; Paez & Liu, 2011) has shown that the way in which people
perceive the current status of a conflict and its future is affected by how they remember
the history of that conflict. Depending on how the history of a conflict is represented in
people’s minds they make either destructive or constructive approaches toward the future
of the conflict. Being able to sympathize with the victims and readiness for reconciliation
are some examples of the effects of the understandings of the past on responses in the
present (Keynan, 2014). I demonstrated that the same is true in the context of social
movements. For example, when the collective memory of a given group in an intractable
conflict puts forth a narrative in which the rival has always been untrustworthy, the peace
outlook will be bleak. In a similar vein, when third parties believe that a social movement
has tried all nonviolent strategies, adopting violence may be perceived as legitimate as
the last resort (Bar-Tal, 2013).
Perceived morality of the social movement
Another important implication of the current findings is that leaders of social
movements, in addition to the movement strategy efficacy, should take into account past
strategies adopted by the movement when they want to decide about the current
movement strategy. As findings show, third parties’ perception of the current strategy is
partly affected by the strategy the movement adopted in the past. Public support is of
paramount importance when policy makers decide to change or put in place a new policy.
Indeed, public support has a substantial effect on change in public policy (see Burstein et
al., 2002). Without enjoying public support social movements may not be able to bring
about social change. Nascent research in the study of collective action has shown that the
amount of support third-party observers are willing to offer is a function of perceived
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morality of the social movement (Orazani & Leidner 2018a; Orazani & Leidner, 2018b).
Therefore, any decision regarding the current movement strategy should be treated with
caution since it may affect, in the light of its past strategy, third parties’ moral perception
of the movement.
Limitations
Some caveats of the current research should be noted. First, I focused solely on a
shift from the use of nonviolence to the use of violence. Of course, social movements can
also shift their strategy from violence to nonviolence. Indeed, there are many historical
examples of social movements abandoning the use of violence in favor of nonviolence
(Dudouet, 2013; Duhart, 2017). Future research should examine how third-party
observers respond to such decisions and whether they may lead to de-escalation of the
conflict. It is possible that third-party observers have difficulty accepting that a social
movement has truly abandoned the use of violence once such a strategy has been used
(“once violent, always violent”). Such perception has its root in essentialist
understandings of social movements (Halperin, Russell, Trzesniewski, Gross, & Dwech,
2011).
Second, although three individual studies (Studies 1, 2, and 4) and the integrated
data analysis showed that third-party observers are more willing to support a violent
social movement that has been historically nonviolent, the results of two individual
studies (Studies 3 and 5) and the interaction effect of condition and study on third-parties’
willingness to join the social movement in the integrated data analysis showed that the
context of studies affected the dependent (i.e., willingness to join) and mediator variables
(i.e., perceived moral continuity). Regarding individual studies results did not hold when
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I used a conflictual context in which a separatist movement, Liberation of Tamil Ealam
(LTE), sought to gain independence from a government, Sri Lankan government. It may
be that people perceive a separatist movement differently compared to a protest that aim
to combat hate groups. Patriotic feelings may propel people to see any separatist
movement in a negative light regardless of the strategy they adopt whereas, combating
hate groups is almost always perceived in a positive light.
It is also likely that people perceive violence differently depending on the entity
against which the violence is being used. Using violence against a government—an entity
who is responsible for citizens’ safety and security as well as society’s stability—
compared to hate groups, is more likely to cause instability in the society. After all, it is a
well-established norm, at least among Western participants, that the government duty is
to preserve law and order. Using violence against an entity who is responsible for society
stability (i.e., a government) may not be seen as much legitimate, compared to hate
groups. Therefore, people may see violence against the government as an unacceptable
strategy regardless of the movements’ previous strategy. Future studies should
experimentally put these hypotheses to test.
Moreover, when I used a domestic movement in the United States with American
participants there was no difference between the two conditions. It may be that American
participants see the use of violence as a strategy that destabilize the society they live in.
Therefore, the ingroup-outgroup dynamic may be at work here in the sense that adopting
violence by a foreign movement could hardly damage domestic stability of American
participants while using violence by a domestic movement (Antifa) may cause social and
economic turmoil. Future studies should also investigate these hypotheses.
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Another issue has to do with the WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized,
Rich, and Democratic) sample. All participants came from the Global North (i.e., the
United States). So, caution is warranted with regard to generalizability of the results to
the Global South. Orazani and Leidner (2018a) conducted a Study with Iranian
participants in which participant preferred nonviolence (rather than violence) as a new
strategy of a failed nonviolent movement (i.e., the Green Movement).
Finally, the concept of third-party observers is multifaceted. It may apply to those
who are neutral

Concluding remarks
I showed that the past strategy of a social movement (violence vs. nonviolence)
influences third-parties’ perception of its current violent strategy and therefore their
willingness to support and joint the movement. Violent strategies attracted more support
from third parties when the social movement was historically nonviolent compared to
when it was historically violent. These results highlight that a social movement does not
operate in a historical vacuum. History matters. Interestingly, third-party observers are
more likely to support a social movement that used violence if it is seen as a last resort
(i.e., nonviolence has failed to achieve its goals), even while perceiving the social
movement as having lost morality. This reputational damage could, however, lead to
backlash in the long-term. Most importantly, both researchers and practitioners – social
movements themselves most of all – should take the historical context and its cognitive
representations into account when examining or making decisions about the present
strategy of a social movement.
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APPENDIX A
TABLES
Table 1. Overall means (standard deviations) and correlations between
dependent and mediator variables in Study 1
Variables
Means (SD) 1
2
3
4
1. Willingness to support
4.33 (2.43)
–
2. Willingness to join
3.24 (2.19)
.78*** –
3. Perceived moral continuity
4.45 (1.94)
.32*** .29*** –
4. Attitudes towards violence
3.67 (2.03)
.42*** .50*** .32*** –
*
p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Table 2. The effect of strategy on variables of interest (Study 1)
Variables

df

F

p

Shifting condition

No shift condition

(n = 189)

(n = 127)

M (SD)

M (SD)

Willingness to support the movement

313

2.72

.10

4.50 (2.48)

4.08 (2.28)

Willingness to join the movement

313

4.37

.03

3.42 (2.34)

2.97 (1.86)

Moral continuity of the movement

313

79.34

< .01

3.77 (1.93)

5.47 (1.57)
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Table 3. Overall means (standard deviations) and correlations between dependent and
mediator variables in Study 2
Variables
Means (SD)
1
2
3
4
5
1. Willingness to support
3.72 (2.50)
–
2. Willingness to join
3.12 (2.34) .87***
–
***
3. Perceived moral continuity 4.28 (2.07) .49
.43***
–
4. Perceived consistency
4.59 (2.43)
.10
.00
.61***
–
***
***
***
5. Attitudes towards violence 4.17 (2.31) .53
.55
.42
.07
–
*
p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Table 4. The effect of condition on variables of interest (Study 2)
Variables

df

F

p

Shifting condition

No shift condition

(n = 170)

(n = 115)

M (SD)

M (SD)

Willingness to support the movement

282

5.65

.02

4.08 (2.52)

3.19 (2.39)

Willingness to join the movement

282

17.07

< .01

3.62 (2.39)

2.39 (2.07)

Moral continuity of the movement

282

40.57

< .01

3.81 (2.17)

4.97 (1.69)

Perceived consistency

281

141.37

< .01

3.24 (1.79)

6.60 (1.78)
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Table 5. Overall means (standard deviations) and correlations between dependent and
mediator variables in Study 3
Variables
Means (SD)
1
2
3
4
1. Willingness to support
3.66 (2.34)
–
2. Willingness to join
2.66 (2.08)
.79***
–
***
3. Perceived moral continuity
4.88 (1.90)
.38
.35***
–
*
4. Perceived consistency
5.23 (2.42)
.11
.13*
.65***
–
***
***
***
5. Attitudes towards violence
4.03 (2.30)
.53
.51
.30
.02
*
p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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5

–

Table 6. The effect of strategy on variables on interest (Study 3)
Variables

df

F

p

Shifting condition

No shift condition

(n = 165)

(n = 158)

M (SD)

M (SD)

Willingness to support the movement

321

1.15

.29

3.79 (2.31)

3.51 (2.37)

Willingness to join the movement

321

.07

.79

2.63 (2.01)

2.69 (2.16)

Moral continuity of the movement

321

58.66

< .01

4.15 (1.95)

5.64 (1.51)

Perceived consistency

321

293.53

< .01

3.60 (1.88)

6.94 (1.62)
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Table 7. Overall means (standard deviations) and correlations between dependent and mediator variables in
Study 4
Variables
Means (SD)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1. Willingness to support
4.63 (2.50)
–
2. Willingness to join
3.88 (2.45)
.86***
–
***
3. Perceived moral continuity
4.39 (1.87)
.46
.37***
–
4. Perceived consistency
4.42 (2.03)
.08
.01
.60***
–
***
***
***
5. Perceived legitimacy of violence
4.51 (2.16)
.61
.50
.63
.27***
–
6. Violence as the last resort
5.02 (1.93)
.49*** .40*** .39*** -.00 .67***
–
***
***
***
***
7. Attitudes towards violence
4.62 (2.27)
.64
.64
.48
.10 .59
.50***
–
*
p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Table 8. The effect of strategy on variables on interest (Study 4)
Variables

df

F

p

Shifting condition

No shift condition

(n = 122)

(n = 93)

M (SD)

M (SD)

Willingness to support the movement

212

3.72

.055

0.56 (0.33)

0.53 (0.34)

Willingness to join the movement

212

3.16

.077

0.45 (0.34)

0.44 (0.34)

Moral continuity of the movement

212

40.49

< .001

3.59 (1.88)

5.18 (1.60)

Perceived consistency

212

121.02

< .001

3.24 (1.53)

5.84 (1.87)

Perceived legitimacy

212

0.00

.988

4.31 (2.28)

4.64 (2.19)

Perceiving violence as the last strategy

212

11.36

.001

5.16 (2.09)

4.63 (1.94)
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Table 9. Overall means (standard deviations) and correlations between dependent and mediator variables in
Study 5
Variables
Means (SD)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1. Willingness to support
2.84 (2.32)
–
2. Willingness to join
2.24 (1.94)
.81***
–
3. Perceived moral continuity
4.94 (2.48)
.33*** .34***
–
4. Perceived consistency
4.86 (2.44)
.08
.07
.70***
–
***
***
***
5. Perceived legitimacy of violence
3.71 (2.51)
.69
.62
.45
.23***
–
***
***
***
6. Violence as the last resort
4.06 (2.20)
.58
.57
.36
.15* .75***
–
***
***
***
*
***
7. Attitudes towards violence
3.77 (2.21)
.48
.54
.27
.13
.50
.34***
–
*
**
***
p < .05, p < .01, p < .001
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Table 10. The effect of strategy on variables on interest (Study 5)
Variables

df

F

p

Shifting condition

No shift condition

(n = 158)

(n = 122)

M (SD)

M (SD)

Willingness to support the movement

278

0.90

.343

2.96 (2.38)

2.69 (2.24)

Willingness to join the movement

278

0.01

.916

2.25 (1.97)

2.22 (1.90)

Moral continuity of the movement

278

103.00

< .001

3.81 (2.24)

6.40 (1.96)

Perceived consistency

278

274.83

< .001

3.36 (1.85)

6.82 (1.56)

Perceived legitimacy

278

0.77

.380

3.60 (2.51)

3.86 (2.52)

Perceiving violence as the last strategy

278

0.28

.598

4.00 (2.24)

4.14 (2.15)
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Table 11. Mediational role of perceived legitimacy and perceiving violence as the last resort (Study 5)
Mediator
Perceived legitimacy

Perceiving violence as the last strategy

DV

Effect

SE

LLCI

ULCI

Willingness to support

-0.17

0.19

-0.55

0.20

Willingness to join

-0.13

0.15

-0.42

0.15

Willingness to support

-0.09

0.16

-0.41

0.23

Willingness to join

-0.07

0.13

-0.33

0.19
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Table 12. The main effects of condition and study (integrated data analysis).
DV
DFwithin
Main effect of condition
Main effect of study
2
F
p
F
p
ηP
ηP2
Willingness to support
1452
9.51
.002
.01
24.75 < .001 .06
Willingness to join
1452
8.80
.003
.01
20.06 < .001 .05
Perceived moral continuity
1451
343.94 < .001 .19
13.73 < .001 .04
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Interaction
F
p
0.59
.673
4.21
.002
5.64
< .001

Table 13. Means (standard deviations) of variables of interest at levels of condition and study as independent
variables (integrated data analysis)
Conditions
Studies
Mean (SD)
Mean (SD)
Nonviolence to violence Continuing violence
1
2
3
4
DV
Willingness to
3.97 (2.51)
3.63 (2.44)
4.52
3.60
3.67
4.30
support
(2.42)
(2.50)
(2.34) (2.50)
Willingness to
3.13 (2.31)
2.84 (2.18)
3.41
2.97
2.68
3.57
join
(2.19)
(2.34)
(2.08) (2.45)
Perceived moral
3.83 (2.04)
5.53 (1.71)
4.75
4.37
4.90
4.24
continuity
(1.94)
(2.07)
(1.90) (1.87)
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5
2.99
(2.32)
2.39
(1.94)
5.20
(2.48)

APPENDIX B
FIGURES

***

Moral continuity

-1.52

***

.54

Shift in strategy

***

Willingness to support

1.49

Figure 1. Mediational effect of moral continuity on the relationship between shift in strategy and
willingness to support the movement, Study 1. *** p < .001

59

***

Moral continuity

-1.52

***

.47

Shift in strategy

***

Willingness to join

1.44

Figure 2. Mediational effect of moral continuity on the relationship between shift in strategy and
willingness to join the movement, Study 1. *** p < .001
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***

Moral continuity

-1.16

***

.70

Shift in strategy

***

Willingness to support

1.71

Figure 3. Mediational effect of moral continuity on the relationship between shift in strategy and
willingness to support the movement, Study 2. *** p < .001
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***

Moral continuity

-1.16

***

.62

Shift in strategy

***

Willingness to join

1.94

Figure 4. Mediational effect of moral continuity on the relationship between shift in strategy and
willingness to join the movement, Study 2. *** p < .001
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***

Moral continuity

-1.49

***

.59

Shift in strategy

***

Willingness to support

1.16

Figure 5. Mediational effect of moral continuity on the relationship between shift in strategy and
willingness to support the movement, Study 3. *** p < .001
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***

Moral continuity

-1.49

***

.45

Shift in strategy

***

Willingness to join

.61

Figure 6. Mediational effect of moral continuity on the relationship between shift in strategy and
willingness to join the movement, Study 3. *** p < .001
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Willingness to support the movement
9
8
7
6
5

4.69

4.31

4

3.89

3.28

4.4 4.18

3.72 3.6

3.14

3

2.79

2
1
study 1

study2
Starting violence

study3

study4

study5

Continuing violence

Figure 7. Willingness to support the movement as a function of condition and study context.
Error bars represent standard errors (integrated data analysis).
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Willingness to join the movement
9
8
7
6
5
4

3.62

3.16

3

3.63 3.49

3.43
2.48

2.56 2.78

2.43 2.32

2
1
study 1

study2
Starting violence

study3

study4

study5

Continuing violence

Figure 8. Willingness to join the movement as a function of condition and study context. Error
bars represent standard errors (integrated data analysis).
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Perceived moral continuity
9
8
6.47

7
5.59

6
5
4

3.9

5.7

5.03
3.7

4.92
4.11

3.57

3.93

3
2
1
study 1

study2
Starting violence

study3

study4

study5

Continuing violence

Figure 9. Perceived moral continuity of the movement as a function of condition and study context.
Error bars represent standard error (integrated data analysis).
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